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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
viso was designed to prevent the Administrator from using his authority
to bring test cases involving new or novel questions of law.2 0 But the
difficulties which the proviso injects are at once obvious. The phrasing
of it supplies to ingenious defendants incentive to obscure the principal
issue with a smoke screen of preliminary questions as to whether the
case does, or does not, involve an issue of law which has been settled
finally by the courts. Does the proviso mean that the Supreme Court
must have ruled on the question? Or is it sufficient that certiorari has
been denied? Or is it enough that one of the courts of appeals has
ruled on the point? And what if there is disagreement among the
circuits ?2o4
Employee suits will continue to be an important instrument for col-
lection of wages, 2 ' and the Jacksonville case still provides a means for
the Administrator to act as a collecting agent in a limited number of
situations. Section 16(c), inasmuch as it provides that when an em-
ployee accepts payment under the Administrator's supervision or con-
sents to an action on his behalf by the Administrator, he waives his right
of action under 16(b) to sue for liquidated damages, should stimulate
voluntary payments by fair-minded employers who formerly did not
make payment voluntarily because they feared that a subsequent suit
for liquidated damages might be brought. But 16(c) may prove not to
be the panacea which the Administrator originally envisioned. The
full efficacy of the section, in view of the proviso limiting the authority
of the Administrator to bring suit to those cases in which the law has
been settled with finality, will depend upon a determination of what
the proviso really means. It is significant that though half the states
have somewhat similar statutes none of these is similarly restricted.
2 2
JAmEs L. TAPLEY.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Airplane Accidents
Decedent, who also held a pilot's license, was permitted by the pilot
to ride in a dual control airplane which was to execute "precision spins"
as part of a demonstration of airplane maneuvers. The pilot was in the
instructor's seat when the plane took off, decedent being seated in the
rear seat. The plane, once aloft, began the maneuver, but instead of
pulling out of the spin and resuming level flight, it continued its down-
ward movement until it crashed on the ground, killing both occupants.
In a suit brought by decedent's administrator to recover for wrongful
20 Id. at 32.
." See note, 63 HARv. L. R. 1078 (1950), which appeared after this note was in
proof.
2'The Division can inspect each year less than 5% of the establishments now
covered by the Act. Hearings on S. 653, supra note 7, at 74.
" See note 17 supra.
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death from the pilot's employer, a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evi-
dence was reversed by a divided court in Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Serv-
ice.' The decision was based primarily on (1) the presumption that
the pilot, having been in control of the airplane when it left the airport,
continued to operate it until the moment of impact, despite the accessi-
bility of the controls to the decedent, and (2) the expert testimony of
two pilots who witnessed the accident attesting to the safety of the
maneuver when properly performed.2 Res ipsa loquitur was not men-
tioned. The -dissent regarded Smith v. Whitley,3 which refused to
apply res ipsa loquitur to an unexplained airplane accident and which
the majority endeavored to distinguish, as controlling the present case,
and emphasized the lack of positive evidence of the cause of the acci-
dent and of who was in control.
The apparently inconsistent results of the Smith and Bruce cases,
on almost identical facts, in deciding whether there was an inference
of negligence sufficient for submission to the jury raise the issue of the
applicability of res ipsa loquitur in North Carolina airplane accident
cases. Since an earlier note in 1943 in this LAw REVIEW 4 has dIealt
with its applicability to airplane disasters generally, its application prior
to the date of that note or in other situations in the law of negligence
will not be considered.
In accordance with the usual requirements, in order to invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it must be shown that the accident would
not have occurred in the absence of negligence, that the airplane was
within the control of defendant, that plaintiff is not in position to know
the cause of the accident, and that the defendant possesses, or may ac-
quire, superior knowledge as to the cause of the accident. 5
In recent years res ipsa. loquitur has been considered with regard to
aircraft accidents most frequently in cases involving private or non-
carrier aircraft. Eight courts have rejected the doctrine either ex-
pressly0 or by implication. 7 On the other hand, in two cases, both of
' 231 N. C. 181, 56 S. E. 2d 560 (1949).-2 .the pilot ... just overdid it a little bit too much ... he tried to make it
too good. He just went too low."
223 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 2d 442 (1943). The pilot and passenger survived the
crash and testfied respectively, "the plane went into a spin and crashed and I do
not know why," and "I don't know just why the plane crashed; it just came down
in a spin with the nose to the ground." A judgment of nonsuit was affirmed; the
court expressly stated that res ipsa loquitur did not apply to such accidents.
Note, 22 N. C. L. REv. 160 (1943).
5 Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P. 2d 226 (1934), cert.
denied, 298 U. S. 644 (1936).
'Morrison v. Le Tourneau Co., 138 F. 2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943) (plane with dual
controls; hence, no theory upon which jury could infer negligence; court said
case not to be decided solely by speculation of jury) ; Deojay v. Lyford, 139 Me.
234, 29 A. 2d 111 (1943) (while landing, plane swerved off of concrete runway, and
tail assembly struck and injured a workman; held, not analogous to car running
off highway because not unusual for airplanes to swerve in this manner when
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
which concerned military aircraft, the doctrine has been indorsed and
applied.8 Three of those courts rejecting res ipsa loquituro have been
confronted with crashes of dual control aircraft, as in the Bruce case,
and have based their decisions in part at least, on defendant's lack of
complete control.
The courts have been more amenable to the application of res ipsa
loquitur where air carriers have been involved. For example, in Smith
v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp.-o the airplane crashed into a
mountainside while on a scheduled flight; the administrator of a de-
landing, and no inference of negligence therefrom); State for use of Piper v.
Henson Flying Service, 60 A. 2d 675 (Md. 1948) (res ipsa loquitur rejected be-
cause of evidence of decedent's negligence in failing to switch from empty to full
gas tank) ; Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. -534, 27 S. E. 2d 442 (1943) (not clear
whether carrier or non-carrier involved; facts would seem to indicate that it was
non-carrier) ; Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S. W. 2d 806 (1943) (plane
equipped with dual controls and therefore not completely within control of de-
fendant).
Brewer v. Thomason, 219 S. W. 2d 758 (Ark. 1949) (ground observers testi-
fied that while plane in flight motor suddenly "went dead"; held, there must be
some evidence of negligence upon which verdict may be based; res ipsa loquitur
not alluded to) ; Hall v. Payne, 189 Va. 140, 52 S. E. 2d 76 (1949) (dual control
airplane crashed while in flight; testimony that immediately prior to take-off motor
did not appear to be functioning properly; held, jury may not decide case by con-
jecture or speculation; the court stated, "It is not contended that res ipsa loquitur
applies.") ; Neel v. Henne, 30 Wash. 2d 24, 190 P. 2d 775 (1948) (motor ceased
to operate immediately after plane took off; held, jury could determine cause of
resulting crash only by conjecture; res ipsa loquitur not mentioned).
8 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 173 F. 2d 92 (9th Cir. 1949)
(Coast Guard plane observed flying continually at hazardously low altitude; five
seconds later, while not observed, collided with plaintiff's power line at altitude
of 187 feet; held, there was presumption of continuing negligence and rcs ipsa
loquitur applied); Yukon Southern Air Transp., Ltd. v. The King [1943] 1
D. L. R 305 (Ex. 1941) (while taking off, R. C. A. F. fighter plane collided with
plaintiff's empty passenger plane parked near runway, killing pilot).
'Morrison v. Le Tourneau Co., 138 F. 2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943); Towle v. Phil-
lips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S. W. 2d 806 (1943) ; Hall v. Payne, 189 Va. 140, 52 S. E.
2d 76 (1949).
"0 76 F. Supp. 940 (D. D. C. 1948) ; accord, Bratt v. Western Air Lines, 169
F. 2d 214 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 886 (1948) (air carrier crashed on
scheduled flight killing plaintiff's decedent; plaintiff relied on res ipsa loquitur and
structural failure; held, doctrine properly applied, but jury verdict for defendant
affirmed) ; La Tour v. United Air Lines, Inc., 65 N. Y. S. 2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
(held, plaintiff's general allegations of negligence had effect of invoking res ipsa
loquitur, and defendant could not force plaintiff to give bill of particulars because
plaintiff may not have sufficient definite facts at his disposal) ; Maloni v. Trans
Canada Lines [1942] 3 D. L. R. 369 (Ont. C. A.) (while landing, air liner made
approach too precipitously; endeavored to pull up; crashed; killed all aboard).
Two courts have avoided a decision on the doctrine by ruling that inferences
of negligence were sufficient to carry plaintiff's case to the jury. Kamienski v.
Bluebird Air Service, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N. E. 2d 131 (1944), aff'd, 389
Ill. 462, 59 N. E. 2d 853 (1945) (evidence that cause of engine failure was de-
fective cam gear; held, without alluding to res ipsa loquitur, failure of dclendant
to prove due care by mechanics who inspected cam gear justified verdict for plain-
tiff); Gill v. Northwest Airline, Inc., 228 Minn. 164, 36 N. W. 2d 785 (1949)
(air carrier crashed 40 miles off course; no survivors or witnesses; court ruled
that it was unnecessary to decide applicability of res ipsa loquitur because possible
for jury to infer negligence from fact that plane left established course and radio
beam without apparent cause).
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ceased passenger alleged specific acts of negligence and sought to invoke
res ipsa loquitur. The court held the doctrine applicable to crashes of
common carriers despite the allegations of specific negligence. In but
one case of this type has the court expressly repudiated it.11
It would seem that the doctrine has been invoked more frequently
in public carrier cases because of the requirement that an air carrier "is
bound to exercise the highest degree of practical care and diligence and
is liable for all matters against which human providence and foresight
might guard . . ." ;12 the slightest deviation from this standard will raise
an inference of negligence.13 Some jurisdictions hold that an accident
involving injury to a passenger will immediately raise a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence on the part of the carrier.' 4 However, the
plaintiff injured in a private airplane crash benefits from no such pre-
sumption, and non-carrier operators and owners must exercise only
".... the degree of care that men of reasonable vigilance and foresight
exercise in the practical conduct of their affairs." 15
The confusion in this field of the law has brought into sharp conflict
a governmental policy to encourage the development of commercial air
transportation, and the right of the passenger to redress for individual
injuries. Conceivably, a single crash of an air carrier could result in
judgments in favor of all of the passengers aboard, and thus produce
financial disaster for the defendant airline. 16 Hence, concern over the
role which could be played by res ipsa loquitur in effecting these para-
lyzing recoveries from an industry which has been promoted by direct
federal aid"7 and by the establishment of auxiliary services' 8 has fos-
tered efforts to limit carrier liability.
"' Ortiz v. Eastern Air Lines [1948] U. S. Av. R. 623 (D. C. Md.) (Defend-
ant's air liner suddenly plunged earthward in clear, quiet weather, carrying all
passengers to deaths. Plaintiff alleged negligence generally and endeavored to in-
voke res ipsa loquitur. Court dismissed the action, holding that the doctrine was
inapplicable because controlling state law repudiated it "in relation to a case of
this kind." The court cited Morrison v. Le Tourneau, note 6 supra, and approved
the reasoning therein, but it would appear that the cases are distinguishable on
their facts.).
"2Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. [1931] U. S. Av. R. 205 (E. D.
Pa.).
'" Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N. E. 2d 131 (1944),
aff'd, 389 Ill. 462, 59 N. E. 2d 853 (1945) ; DYIsmTA AND DYxsTRA, BusiNEss
LAW oF AviATioN 314 (1946); FixEL, LAW oF AviATION 182 (2d ed. 1945);
RHYNE, AvrATiON AccMENT LAW 44, 55 (1947).
"'Johnson v. Eastern Air Lines, 177 F. 2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949) (in refusing to
set aside verdict for defendant, held, in South Carolina and New York presump-
tion of negligence rebuttable).
" Greunke v. North Am. Airways Co., 201 Wis. 565, 230 N. W. 618 (1930);
DYKSTRA AND DYKsTRA, op. cit. supra note 13 at 243; RHYNE, op. cit. supra note
13, at 57.
6 Rieber, Some Aspects of Air Carriers' Liability, 11 LAW AND CoNm1M-P.
PROB. 524 (1946); Note, U. Cul. L. REv. 365 (1948).
1752 STAT. 998 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §486(b) (1946).
1852 STAT. 985, 986 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §452-457 (1946).
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Paramount among these efforts, and the most successful, has been
the Warsaw Convention of 1929.19 This agreement among the princi-
pal nations of the world, applying to international air transportation,
makes proof of negligence unnecessary 20 but relieves from liability the
carrier which proves that all necessary measures to avoid damage were
taken or that it was impossible to take them,2 ' and in the absence of
a showing of willful misconduct by the carrier, limits recovery to
$8,291.8722
The adoption of similar federal legislation -designed to protect the
interests of the passenger, carrier and public has been recommended. 28
While the suggested plans for limiting liability on domestic airlines
have varied, generally they have in effect called for a statutory declara-
tion of res ipsa loquitur, at least insofar as plaintiffs are relieved from
proving specific negligence, and have established a fixed maximum on
recoveries, absent proof of willful misconduct. These proposals are an
adoption of the pattern and spirit of the Warsaw Convention for do-
mestic purposes.
Air carriers, too, have instituted practices designed to curtail lia-
bility. It has become a universal practice for airlines, in contracting
with their passengers, to issue tickets stamped "Subject to tariff regula-
tions." This apparently innocuous phrase, probably unnoticed by the
passenger, has the legal effect of advising him of the provisions and
requirements of the airline's tariffs and regulations on file with the
Civil Aeronautics Board, pursuant to statute,24 as for example a require-
ment that notice of claim be filed or suit brought within a fixed period.25
These provisions of the contract of carriage embodied in the tariff regu-
lations are binding although rarely known to the passenger and vir-
tually never to his personal representative.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not yet been presented with
an air carrier situation in which it would be compelled to decide the ap-
plicability of res ipsa loquitur and deal with the concomitant problem of
policy and the limiting of airline liability. It may be expected, however,
that the unparalleled liberality manifested in the Bruce decision, in al-
49 STAT. 3000, U. S. TrATz SER. No. 876 (Dep't State 1929).
20 Ibid. Article 26. One seeking damages for death or injury to passengers
makes out a prima facie case upon showing a contract of carriage under the Con-
vention, that damage was suffered, and the amount of such damage.1 Ibid. Article 20.2 Ibid. Article 22.
2' Reiber, op. cit. mrupra note 16, at 535.
2'52 STAT. 992 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §483 (1946).
21 Brandt v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. [1948] U. S. Av. R. 637 (S. D. N. Y.)
(in wrongful death action court denied plaintiff's motion to strike airline's defense
that notice of claim not filed within 90 days of accident, or suit brought within
one year, as required by tariff regulations filed by carrier with CAB) ; accord,
Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 2 Avi. 15,023 (W. D. Wash. 1949) (upheld
validity of 30-day notice of claim provision as reasonable).
[Vol. 28
NOTES AND COMMENTS
lowing an inference of negligence to go to the jury, will be duplicated a
fortiorari in air carrier cases, where reasons of policy reinforce the
result.
The refusal of some courts to apply res ipsa loquitur has resulted
from a feeling of uncertainty over the cause of the accident; Justice
Barnhill, dissenting in the Bruce case, quoted from the Smith decision
that "airplanes do fall without fault of the pilot," a statement originating
in 1933.26 While this statement still may be valid, though to a lesser
extent, it should not be concluded that the causes of airplane accidents
are so obscure as to defy determination.2 7 Recent reports of the Civil
Aeronautics Board indicate that less than .7% of all aircraft accidents
are of undetermined cause. 28 This would seem to demonstrate that
when airplanes collide or crash today, there is a determinable cause
which, when ascertained, may raise an inference of negligence, unavoid-
able accident, or act of God,2 9 and hence is a proper matter for jury
consideration.
It may be plausibly argued that the Smith case insofar as it refused
to apply res ipsa loquitur conflicts with the approach of the Court in the
Bruce decision since the Court in the latter case reached a result which
other courts, even those expressly applying the doctrine, have been
unable to reach in dual control situations. The finding in the Bruce
decision that there was an inference of negligence is subject to question
in view of the existence of dual controls and the absence of proof that
the pilot continued to control the airplane throughout the maneuver.
In any event, the submission of the inference of negligence to the jury
allowed to plaintiff the exact procedural relief which res ipsa loquitur is
designed to afford, and renders the Smith case of dubious value as a
precedent.
R. VINCENT SPRACKLIN.
"Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N. Y. Supp.
469 (County Ct. 1933).
" RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 137.
"' Annual Report of CAB-Fiscal Year 1949. Of 7,465 non-air-carrier accidents,
only 47 (.6%) were found to be of undetermined cause, the major causes being
pilot error (76%), structural or engine failure (12%), and weather (5%); of
132 air carrier accidents the causes of only 2 (1.5%) were undetermined, the major
causes being pilot error (39%), structural or engine failure (28%), and inade-
quate maintenance (9%).
"0 While testimony and findings of the CAB concerning the causes of accidents
are not admissible in the courts, they are available to the public, and may advise
plaintiff of the most effective manner in which to present his case. 52 STAT. 1012
(1938), 49 U. S. C. §581 (1946).
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